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Dans cet article, on examine les developpements survenus en 1997 en ce qui a trait:
* au droit materiel en vertu de l'article 15 de la Charte canadienne des droits et
libertis et des lois provinciales et fed6rales sur les droits de la personne; et
* aux questions de comptence et de procedure reli6es 1'6valuation des droits en
equity des clients.
Dans l'ensemble, 1997 a 6t6 une meilleure annee que la precedente dans le secteur du
droit en equity qui touche (ou pourrait toucher) les clients pauvres. Apr~s avoir refus6
d'interjeter un appel dans plusieurs causes de grande importance pour les clients
pauvres, la Cour supreme du Canada a donne h l'article 15 du droit en equity un solide
coup de pouce lorsqu'elle a rendu sa decision dans la cause Eldridge c. Colombie-
Britannique . la fin de l'annee et m~me les motifs du jugement dans la cause Eaton
et le Conseil de l'ducation du comtj de Brant permet d'en tirer certains principes
jurisprudentiels utiles. Cette annee, nos decisions ont eu tendance a reduire la protec-
tion de l'article 15 de la meme fagon que cela est devenu une pratique routini~re A la
Cour federale et a la Cour d'appel f6d6rale. I1 est possible que la cause Eldridge ait
un effet correcteur dans le futur. D'un autre c6t6, la Division g6nerale de la Cour de
1' Ontario a permis pour la premiere fois que les reductions du gouvernement puissent
contrevenir a 1'article 15 et la Cour d'appel de la Nouvelle-Acosse a corrig6 certains
problmes resultants de decisions prises pr6cedemment.
Bien que la jurisprudence de fond concernant les lois sur les droits de la personne et
1'article 15 de la Charte continue d'Etre utile, il est toujours difficile d'en faire profiter
les clients pauvres. Tant le gouvernement provincial que le gouvernement federal
continuent de faire la sourde oreille aux efforts de reforme du droit, ce qui entraine
des proc6dures en litige lorsque cela n'est pas n6cessaire. De plus, il semble que la
Commission ontarienne des droits de la personne continue de faire les frais d'une
absence de r6vision judiciaire.
* Copyright © 1997, Judith Keene. Judith Keene is a research lawyer with the Clinic Resource Of-
fice of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan. Opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not neces-
sarily those of the Ontario Legal Aid Plan.
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INTRODUCTION
On the whole, it has been a better year than last in the area of equity law that affects
(or could affect) poor clients. After denying leave to appeal in several cases of great
importance to poor clients, the Supreme Court of Canada gave s. 15 equity rights a
significant boost with its decision in Eldridge v British Columbia,I at the end of the
year, and even its reasons for judgement in Re Eaton and Brant County Board of
Education 2 yielded some helpful jurisprudence. Our Court of Appeal's decisions this
year have tended to narrow s.15 protection in much the same way that has become routine
at the Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal; perhaps Eldridge will have a
corrective effect for the future. On the other hand, the Ontario Court General Division has
for the first time allowed that government cut-backs can offend s.15, and the Court of
Appeal in Nova Scotia has corrected some problems arising from earlier decisions.
While the substantive jurisprudence under both human rights legislation and s. 15 of
the Charter continues to be helpful, getting its benefit for poor clients continues to be
difficult. Both the provincial and the federal government continue to turn a deaf ear
to efforts at law reform, necessitating litigation where it should not be necessary.
Further, it appears that the Ontario Human Rights Commission continues to respond
to little short of judicial review.
This article is organized under the following headings:
I. Recent Equity Jurisprudence
A. Social Assistance
B. Unemployment/Employment Insurance
C. Canada Pension Plan
D. Employment Law
E. Education: Useful Jurisprudence from Eaton decision
F. S. 15(2): the Latest on "amelioration of disadvantage" from the Ontario
Court of Appeal
G. Eldridge: Significant Help from the Supreme Court of Canada
II. How to Get There From Here
A. New Legislation; New Needs for Litigation on Behalf of Poor Clients
B. Getting Action from the Ontario Human Rights Commission
I. RECENT EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
As noted in last year's article, 3 the Supreme Court has repeatedly pointed to human
rights law as an aid in the analysis of s.15. For this reason, the review of cases below
will be organized according to subject-matter, rather than whether the equity argument
1. (1995), 125 DLR 323 (BCCA); rev'd (1997) 218 NR 161 (SCC).
2. (1995) 22 OR (3d) 1 (CA), rev'd (1997) 207 NR 171 (SCC).
3. "Equity Law for Clinic Advocates: a 1996 Review" (1996) 12 Journal of Law and Social Policy 81.
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was made under s.15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,4 or under
human rights legislation.
A. Social Assistance
N.S. Court of Appeal partially overrules Rhyno, upsetting negative precedent
In Rhyno v. Minister of Community Services,5 the Trial Division of the Nova Scotia
Supreme Court upheld a regulation which imposed a six-month waiting period before
a married person who had separated from his or her spouse was eligible for benefits
as a sole support parent. No such waiting period applied to other applicants. Despite
the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the "similarly situated" analysis
in its very first s. 15 decision, Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia,6 the judge
in Rhyno held that the regulation did not discriminate within the meaning of s.15 of
the Charter on grounds of marital or family status because all "married separated
people with children" were treated the same.
The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal has partially overruled Rhyno in a subsequent case.
The issue of the six-month waiting period arose again in a complaint to the Nova Scotia
Human Rights Commission. A Human Rights Board of Inquiry held that it was bound
by Rhyno. On appeal, the N.S. Court of Appeal reversed the tribunal and expressly
disapproved the reasoning in Rhyno: Re Carrigan and Nova Scotia Human Rights
Commission.7 The Court held that the regulation clearly created unequal treatment of
married people and referred the matter back to the Board of Inquiry to determine
whether the distinction was discriminatory.
Carrigan is a useful affirmation that "similarly situated" reasoning is not appropriate
in equality analysis whether under the Charter or under provincial human rights
legislation.
Discriminatory Nova Scotia Shelter Rules Struck Down
In Way v. Covert et al,8 the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal overturned a lower court
decision 9 upholding a regulation which has caused much hardship to people with
disabilities and their families in Nova Scotia. At issue was a regulation under the Nova
Scotia Family Benefits Act which disallowed shelter allowances to recipients who
lived with relatives if the relative's income exceeded a prescribed amount. The
appellant had argued that this regulation was ultra vires the Act and violated s.15 of
the Charter of Rights. Both arguments had been dismissed by the Trial Division. The
Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to consider the Charter issue: two members of
4. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B of
the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. Hereinafter the Charter.
5. (1994), 131 N.S.R.(2d) 353.
6. [1989] 1 SCR 143; 91 NR 255; 56 DLR (4th) 1 (SCC), 56 DLR (4th) 1.
7. (1997) 28 CHRR D/281 [CRO MSJ-790].
8. (1997) 147 DLR (4th) 505 (NSCA).
9. (1996) 139 DLR (4th) 133 (NSSC).
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the Court found the regulation to be ultra vires the Act without reference to discrimina-
tion. They held that notwithstanding the broad regulation-making power in the Act,
that power did "not extend to denying benefits simply because a person, otherwise
eligible, is living with a relative who has a certain level of income. Such a denial of
benefits is a fundamental departure from, and inconsistent with, the basic standard of
eligibility set out in the Statute". In a concurring decision, Pugsley J. suggested that
the regulation was ultra vires because, even apart from the Charter, the regulation-
making power should not be interpreted as allowing discriminatory action.
Way is one of several decisions from other jurisdictions to strike down social assistance
regulations deeming support where support is not actually provided. Ontario social
assistance regulations are riddled with similar deeming provisions, both directly and
indirectly, most of which have never been challenged.
B. Unemployment/Employment Insurance
Court of Appeal Diminishes Rights in Purpose-Finding Exercise
In Schafer v Canada (Attorney General),10 two Ontario couples challenged the
amended parental benefit provisions in the Unemployment Insurance Act, 11 s.11(3),
(4) and (7). The provisions authorized a total of 25 weeks' combined payment of
maternal and parental benefits, but limited adoptive parents to 10 weeks extended
parental benefits. Subsection 11(7) granted 5 weeks of additional benefits to an
adopted child with a medically-certified "condition", but only for children who were
over the age of 6 months at the time of adoption. The Ontario Court, General Division,
held that the provision of shorter leaves to adoptive parents were discriminatory and
not saved by s. 1.
The Schafer decision was partly overturned by the Court of Appeal. 12 The Court of
Appeal (Brooke, Osbourne and Austin JJA), acknowledged that ss.11(7) the age
limitation discriminatory, but reversed on. the question of whether s. 11(3) and (4)
infringed s. 15.
The focus of the Court of Appeal's decision is the purpose of the "legislative scheme".
The provision at issue reads as follows:
11. (3) Subject to subsection (7), the maximum number of weeks for which
benefit may be paid in a benefit period
(a) for the reason of pregnancy is fifteen;
(b) for the reason of caring for one or more new-born children of the
claimant or one or more children placed with the claimant for the
purpose of adoption is ten; and
(c) for the reason of prescribed illness, injury or quarantine is fifteen.
10. (1996) 29OR (3d) 496.
11. R.S.C. 1985,c.U-1.
12. Schafer v Canada (Attorney General) (1997) 35 OR (3d) 1; 102 OAC 321 (OCA).
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(4) Subject to subsection (7), the maximum number of weeks for which
benefit may be paid
(a) in respect of a single pregnancy is fifteen; and
(b) in respect of caring for one or more new-born or adopted
children as a result of a single pregnancy or placement is ten.
(5) In a claimant's benefit period, the claimant may combine weeks of
benefit to which the claimant is entitled for any of the reasons referred
to in subsection (3), but the maximum number of combined weeks is thirty.
It appears that the reason for the Court of Appeal's decision may lie in the peculiar
structure of s.11. The section deals with unemployment benefits for sickness, for
pregnancy and for child-care of new arrivals to a family by birth or adoption. It is
possible that the inclusion of sickness benefits in the section gave rise to a fragmented
approach to the enunciation of the rationale for the provision. The court below had
found that the purpose of s. 11(3) and(4) was "to facilitate the process of family formation".
The Court of Appeal took a much narrower view, holding that the purpose was "to protect
women who work from the economic costs of pregnancy and childbirth".
Although the Court of appeal specifically disagreed only as to the purpose of the
"legislative scheme", it is also clear that it disagreed as to the nature of the provision
under constitutional scrutiny. It is difficult to imagine how else it could have confined
its view on legislative purpose to the circumstances of giving birth. It is as though the
Court disregarded the existence of subsection 11(3)(b) and (4)(b) in the "legislative
scheme". This made possible the finding that adoptive parents had been denied equal
benefit of the law (para 48) but that there was no discrimination because the legislation
was directed to a situation experienced only by women who give birth.
This purpose-finding exercise that focussed on only one part of one section of s. 11
produced the type of results predicted by McLachlin J in her argument 13 against the
circularity of the Gonthier addition of a "relevancy" test to the s. 15 analysis:
"Having defined the functional values underlying the legislation in terms of the al-
leged discriminatory ground, it follows of necessity that the basis of the distinc-
tion is relevant to the legislative aim. This illustrates the aridity of relying on the
formal test of logical relevance as proof of nondiscrimination under s. 15(1)."
'14
[emphasis added]
13. In Morin ...
14. Miron and Valliere v Trudel (1995), 181 NR 253 (SCC) at para 16, emphasis added. McLachlin J's disap-
proval of this type of reasoning, concurred in in Miron by Sopinka, Cory and Iacobucci JJ was echoed by
Cory and lacobucci, JJ in Thibaudeau v Minister of National Revenue (1995), 182 NR 1 (SCC), at pare
93, and by L'Heureux-Dub6, J in Egan and Nesbit v Canada (1995), 182 NR 161 (SCC) para 172-3:
"Relevance can, by definition, only be evaluated as against the purpose of the impugned
legislation. Consequently, it fails to take into account the possibility that a distinction
that is relevant to the purpose of the legislation may nonetheless still have a discriminatory
effect ... Using relevance to define the absence or presence of discrimination raises other
difficulties. It is no good, for instance, for a distinction to be relevant to a legislative
(1998) 13 Journal of Law and Social Policy
A narrow approach to interpreting the purpose of the impugned legislation was also
rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Eldridge,15 discussed below.
An application to the Supreme Court of Canada for leave to appeal the decision in
Schafer has been filed.
C. Canada Pension Plan
1. Survivors' benefits: Law to be heard by Supreme Court of Canada
As discussed in last year's article, the arbitrary age limit for survivors' benefits was
challenged unsuccessfully under s.15 in Law v The Minister of Employment and
Immigration.16 In its decision, the Pension Appeals Board (PAB) subjected age, an
enumerated ground of discrimination, to the type of analysis that has been confined
by the Supreme Court of Canada to unenumerated grounds, 17 and quoted but otherwise
appeared not to apply Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence as to the test for the
application of s.15. The PAB also purported to impose a more stringent test for age
discrimination than for other enumerated grounds, thus departing from the approach
of the Supreme Court of Canada. 18 The PAB also found that the impugned restrictions
were also justified under s.1, although its rationale bears little resemblance to that
indicated by current Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Federal Court of Appeal found
no reviewable error.
Leave to appeal the Law decision has been granted by the Supreme Court, but at the
date of this article, the matter has not been heard.
Contribution rules' effect on disabled persons; leave denied by Supreme Court of Canada
As noted in last year's article, the contribution rules that apply only in respect of CPP
disability pensions were challenged under section 15 of the Charter in Xinos v.
Minister of National Health and Welfare.19 An application to the Federal Court of
Appeal for judicial review was unsuccessful. In brief oral reasons, the court concluded
that the different contributory requirements for disability pensions did not violate the
equality rights section of the Charter and, if they did, were saved by section 1.20
On September 25, 1997, the Supreme Court of Canada refused leave to appeal.
purpose if that purpose is, itself, discriminatory."
15. Supra, fn 1.
16. (1995), CEB & PGR #8574; application for judicial review dismissed: (1996), 196 NR 73 (FCA).
17. See the remarks of Lamer, CJC in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General) (1993) 158 NR
1 (SCc), at 99.
18. See for example McKinney v University of Guelph (1990), 76 DLR (4th) 545 (SCC) at 647 and 682.
19. (January 22, 1996), CEB & PGR #8609 CT F.C.A. File No. A-212-96.
20. Xinos v Attorney General of Canada et al (unreported) 19 May, 1997, File A-212-96 (FCA).
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PAB Denies Charter Challenge to CPP Definition of "Spouse"
In Minister of Human Resources Development v Fisk21 the PAB held, by a three-two
split, that the definition of "spouse" in section 2 of the CPP, which requires that
spouses be of opposite sex, does not violate the Charter.
In Fisk an application for survivor's benefits had been denied because both the
applicant and the deceased contributor were male. A Review Tribunal had found, on
appeal, that s. 2 violated the Charter, that the words "of the opposite sex" should be
read out of the definition, and that the applicant was therefore eligible as a surviving
"spouse". The Minister appealed to the PAB on the sole issue of whether s. 2 was saved
by s. 1 of the Charter, conceding that it was discriminatory under s. 15 of the Charter.
The appeal was heard by a panel of five judges. Foisy JA, with Dureault and McMahon
JJ concurring, held that the purpose of the survivor's benefit was to protect individuals
likely to have been financially dependent on their spouses against the loss of a
breadwinner's earnings, and that the exclusion of same-sex spouses was rationally
connected to this purpose on the basis that same-sex relationships were less likely to
result in financial interdependence. Foisy JA found that the exclusion of same-sex
spouses was a reasonable limit under s. 1, observing, on the issues of minimal
impairment and proportionality, that the courts should be reluctant to interfere with
social benefit schemes as complex and intricate as the CPP. In dissent, Chilcott J, with
MacIntosh J concurring, found that the goal of the legislation, to alleviate the poverty
of surviving spouses, had not been shown to be directed at protecting or supporting
"traditional" family units, and that the exclusion of same-sex spouses could not be
said to have a rational connection to legislative purpose.
The majority in Fisk appeared to have forgotten that the objective that is relevant to
the section 1 analysis is the objective of the infringing measure. McLachlin J sounded
a warning against over-broad interpretation of objective in RJR MacDonald Inc. v.
Canada:22
Care must be taken not to over-state the objective. The objective relevant to the section
one analysis the objective of the infringing measure, since it is the infringing measure
and nothing else which is sought to be justified. If the objective is stated too broadly, its
importance may be exaggerated and the analysis compromised. [emphasis added]
The majority also appears to have given undue weight to the discredited notion that
complex social benefit schemes should attract an extraordinary degree of judicial
deference. 23 In RJR McDonald, McLachlin J, in the course of discussing contextual
approach, noted that
21. (September 25, 1997), Appeal CP 4471 [unreported].
22. (1995) 127 D.L.R (4th) 1, at 93-94.
23. Judicial deference in section 1 most typically becomes an issue in relation to the second test of the
three part proportionality test, particularly when this test is being applied to remedial "social" legisla-
tion in which the legislature is making choices about the allocation of scarce resources between dif-
ferent disadvantaged groups. The Supreme Court of Canada, (in Eldridge, supra, at N.R. 230-232,
paras 85, 86) has accepted that deference to government's discretion to determine what and how to
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... it cannot be carried to the extreme of treating the challenged law as a unique
socio-economic phenomenon, of which Parliament is deemed the best judge.
24
D. Employment Law
Record award for racial harassment on the job
In Naraine v Ford Motor Co. No.3,25 a board of inquiry under the Ontario Human
Rights Code found that there had been significant racial harassment of the com-
plainant, who had been employed at the Ford Motor plant in Windsor. The complainant
was ultimately26 awarded reinstatement in employment with full wages, benefits and
seniority as of the date of receipt of the decision, damages for lost income and benefits
for a period of unemployment just short of two years, retraining and employee
assistance counselling to the complainant, $20,000 compensation for infringement of
rights, $10,000 for mental anguish, and prejudgment interest.
Pay Equity: First Ontario Victory in Fighting Discrimination-by-Cutbacks
SEIU Local 204 v Ontario27 was an application under Rule 14 for a declaration that
Schedule J of the Savings and Restructuring Act, 1996, which amended the Pay Equity
Act to discontinue the use of the proxy method of comparison and to cap employers'
financial obligations already accrued under pay equity, infringed ss.15(1) and 28 of
the Charter. The declaration of unconstitutionality was granted.
Without any particularly clear or detailed analysis, O'Leary J found that:
the Pay Equity Act is remedial "human rights" legislation (p.22)
spend on social programs cannot be absolute:
... members of this Court have suggested that deference should not be accorded to the
legislature merely because an issue is a social one or because a need for governmental
incrementalism is shown; see Egan, supra, at para 97 (per L'Heureux-Dube J.) and at
paras 215-216 (per Iacobucci J.). In the present case, the failure to provide sign language
interpreters would fail the minimal impairment branch of the Oakes test under a deferential
approach ... the leeway to be granted to the state is not infinite. Governments must demon-
strate that their actions infringe the rights in question no more than is reasonably necessary
to achieve their goals. Thus, I stated the following for the Court in Titreault-Gadoury,
supra, at p.44:
It should go without saying, however, that the deference that will be accorded
to the government when legislating in these matters does not give them an
unrestricted licence to disregard an individual's Charter rights. Where the
government cannot show that it had a reasonable basis for concluding that
it has complied with the requirement of minimal impairment in seeking to
attain its objectives, the legislation will be struck down.
24. RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada supra at D.L.R. 91.
25. (1996) 27 CHRR D1230.
26. Naraine v Ford Motor #5 (1996) 28 CHRR D/267.
27. (1997) 35 OR (3d) 508 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.).
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" the plight of the affected subgroup of women is better than it was before the
passage of the Act, but that a disadvantage was effected by the amendment.
(p.27)
" "Section 15(2) does not protect affirmative action legislation from attacks from
members of the disadvantaged group it was designed to benefit" (p.29-30)
" there is no positive obligation on government to relieve inequality, and it could
have repealed the whole Pay Equity Act (30-31) but
" the government must justify under s.1 the creation of disadvantage to part of
the group meant to be benefitted by the Act (33).
The court appeared to find it relevant to the s.1 analysis that "the proxy method was
removed ... in the absence of any study on the efficacy of the proxy method in
operation and in the absence of any demonstrated problem or any literature concluding
proxy is inappropriate".
28
The decision contains no comment on the s.28 argument.
The provincial government has announced that it will not appeal the decision.
E. Education: Useful Jurisprudence from Eaton decision
The appeal in Re Eaton and Brant County Board of Education29 was granted unanimously
by the Supreme Court in 1996. The reasons for the decision were released in 1997.
The Court found that the decision of a school board's Identification, Placement and
Review Committee (the IPRC) to place a disabled child in a segregated class rather
than let her remain in the general primary school population did not breach s.15
because is lacked a presumption that disabled students would attend regular classrooms,
unless those proposing a segregated classroom could establish that a segregated placement
would provide a better educational experience than an integrated classroom.
While the result on the specific issue is disappointing, the Eaton decision provides
helpful resolution of a problem that was beginning to beset advocates arguing s.15
cases. The decision provides an answer to government's attempts to confine construc-
tive ("adverse-effects") discrimination to "facially neutral" rules based on
stereotypes, or to argue that proof that an impugned government action, legislation
or regulations was based on a stereotype, or the perpetrates a stereotype, is a necessary
precondition to establish a breach of s.15.
It is no coincidence that stereotyping has been cited as a major evil in s.15 cases
addressed by the Supreme Court. This is because the overwhelming majority of these
cases have addressed deliberate differentiation because of citizenship, age, sex, etc.
In such cases, the respondent government agency knew that it was distinguishing on
a ground that might be included under s. 15. It rationalized its choice to do so by making
28. Supra at 532-53.
29. Supra fn2.
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assumptions concerning the relevant facts, and many of the assumptions were revealed
as stereotypes.
By contrast, the doctrine of constructive/adverse effect discrimination and the cor-
responding duty to accommodate that has been developed first under human rights
law and later under s. 15 of the Charter of Rights30 has been developed to address, not
the fictitious differences that are the basis-of stereotype, but real differences related
to personal characteristics addressed by human rights legislation and the Charter. In
a constructive/adverse-effects discrimination claim, the claimant group proves the
existence of a rule, restriction or requirement, and demonstrates how that rule,
restriction or requirement operates as a barrier when applied to the real facts associated
with a prohibited ground of discrimination. The classic example, a 6-foot height and
180-pound weight requirement for employment, acts as a barrier to women's employ-
ment because most women are in fact under that height and weight, not because they
are stereotypically perceived to be so.
In Eaton, Justice Sopinka for the entire Supreme Court acknowledged that the issue
was not only stereotypes but the actual facts concerning the abilities and disabilities
of the child in question.
In discussing the application of s. 15, Justice Sopinka quoted McIntyre J. (in Andrews) to
the effect that "accommodation of differences is the true essence of equality", and went
on
This emphasizes that the purpose of s.15 of the Charter is not only to prevent dis-
crimination by the application of stereotypical characteristics to individuals, but
also to ameliorate the position of groups within Canadian society who have suffered
disadvantage by exclusion from mainstream society ...
The principle object of certain of the prohibited grounds is the elimination of dis-
crinination by the attribution of untrue characteristics based on stereotypical at-
titudes relating to immutable conditions such as race or sex. 31 [emphasis added]
Justice Sopinka went on to apply his more general remarks to disability:
In the case of disability, this is one of the objectives. The other equally important
objective seeks to take into account the true characteristics of this group which act
as headwinds to the enjoyment of society's benefits and to accommodate them ...
The discrimination inquiry which uses "the attribution of stereotypical charac-
teristics" reasoning as commonly understood is simply inappropriate here. It may be
seen rather as a case of reverse stereotyping which, by not allowing for the condi-
tion of a disabled individual, ignores his or her disability and forces the individual
to sink or swim within the mainstream environment. It is recognition of the actual
30. For a discussion of principles in regard to both "direct" and "constructive" discrimination, see "Dis-
crimination in the Provision of Government Services and S.15 of the Charter. Making the Best of the
Judgements in Egan, Thibaudeau and Miron" (1995) 11 Journal of Law and Social Policy 107.
31. Supra, fn 2, at NR 203-204 para 62-63, emphasis added.
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characteristics, and reasonable accommodation of these characteristics which is the
central purpose of s.15(l) in relation to disability.
32
Justice Sopinka's application of the relevant general principles to disability provides
an example which can easily be extended to other grounds of discrimination.
F. S. 15(2): the Latest on "amelioration of disadvantage" from the Ontario
Court of Appeal
Section 15(2) of the Charter provides:
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its ob-
ject the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups including
those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
Given the wide range of disadvantages that beset clinic clients, and the wide range of
criteria for qualifying for programs that might make their lives better, it is not
surprising that advocates will find themselves challenging such programs on occasion.
A recent Ontario Court of Appeal decision has been added to the very few cases in
which s.15(2) has been considered.
In Lovelace v Ontario33 Aboriginal groups not registered as Bands under the Indian
Act claimed that their exclusion from a profit-sharing arrangement limited to Bands
(and certain others) offended s.15. Government successfully appealed a decision in
their favour made pursuant to an Application under Rule 14.
The Court of Appeal made some general statements about s.15(2).
We view s. 15(2) ... as furthering the guarantee of equality in s.15(1), not as provid-
ing an exception to it.
34
... government action under s.15(2) should be generously and liberally assessed,
consistent with the court's approach to the interpretation of the rights and freedoms
in the rest of the Charter.
35
Expanding on these remarks, the CA made some initially rather troubling statements
about the degree of judicial scrutiny proper to a s.15(2) program:
We also think that judicial review of s. 15(2) programs should be limited ... if the
court is satisfied that the target of the government's program is a disadvantaged
group and the object or purpose of the program is to ameliorate the conditions of
that group, the program fits within s.15(2). Nothing in s.15(2) calls on the court ...
to assess the effectiveness of the program or the means used to achieve the
government's ameliorative object or whether a reasonable relationship exists be-
32. Ibid, at NR 203-204 para 63.
33. (1997) 33 OR (3d) 735, (OCA).
34. Supra at 752.
35. Ibid at 754.
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tween the cause of the disadvantage and the form of the ameliorative action. If some
aspect of the program infringes the equality guarantee, the government's rationale
or justification for the infringement should be considered under s.l of the Charter.
... If government aff'mnative action programs can be too readily challenged be-
cause, for example, they do not go far enough in remedying disadvantage, govern-
ments will be discouraged from initiating such programs. Governments should be
able to establish special programs under s.15(2) that distinguish between or even
within groups protected under s.15(1).
36
Having said the above, the Court of Appeal also noted:
Nonetheless, s.15(2) does not immunize special programs from constitutional
review. Even where the substance of the program is authorized by s.15(2), some
feature of it may be discriminatory and thus infringe s.15(l). 37
However, it clearly signalled that reactionary challenges by privileged groups would
not be uncritically received.
The language and history of s. 15(2) seem to militate against ... challenges to s. 15(2)
programs by members of socially advantaged or privileged groups. [Quoting from R
v Edwards Books and Art Ltd] ... the courts must be cautious to ensure that [the
Charter] does not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition of less ad-
vantaged persons."38
Obviously equity-seeking groups might be concerned about the court's comments
relating to "limited" judicial scrutiny. Concerns about some of the above-noted
generalizations may be somewhat reduced after close scrutiny of the exercise actually
undertaken by the CA in respect of the program at issue. Although the Court's review
started with the statement that "characterizing the object or purpose of a s.15(2) program
is the key to its constitutionality" (p.20, para 69), it is arguable that the government
succeeded because it was able not only to identify non-discriminatory reasons for the
"marker" 39 it used to restrict the program, but to establish that the restriction contributed
to the amelioration of disadvantage experienced by Aboriginal people.
While the Lovelace decision is somewhat rambling, it is clear that the court found that
the objectives of a s.15(2) program had to be constitutionally valid as a part of the
furtherance of equality under s.15(1). The court listed the reasons why it found the
project "authorized by s.15(2)":
1. the historical record
2. the project's reserve base
36. Ibid at 754-755.
37. Ibid, at 755.
38. Ibid at 755-756.
39. To use the term used by Justice McLachlin in Miron.
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3. matters of identification and political and financial accountability, and
4. the Bands' interest and experience in Casino gaming
In respect of the program at issue, the court found that "benefiting only the Bands is
the true purpose of the project, and that defining the purpose in this way is entirely
consistent with the goals of s.15(2)".40 Items 1, 2 and 4 on the above-noted list
establish the government's constitutionally valid reasons for establishing the project,
but they do no more than that. They do not establish constitutionally valid reasons for
restricting it. Only item 3 does that. The government clearly convinced the court that
restricting profit sharing to Bands was a reliable way to ensure that the money
benefitted Aboriginal people and no one else.
The court noted that the membership criteria of the non-registered Aboriginal groups
varied, with differing definitions of the terms "Metis" and "non-status Indian", and
differing rules about the membership of people who did not define themselves as
Aboriginal. It also pointed out that there was little evidence before the it as to the
governing mechanisms of the groups. The court identified "matters of identification
and accountability" as differences relevant to the purpose of the project.
Arguably, it would not have been sufficient for the government to rely only on items
1, 2 and 4 in the list above. It was necessary to demonstrate why the restriction at issue
contributed to the amelioration of disadvantage experienced by Aboriginal people,
and the court noted the existence of that nexus, in a discussion of identification and
accountability. Clearly, the court had been satisfied that the restriction was a logical
way to ensure that the money flowed to the target group and to no one else.
Arguably, if there had been no evidence adduced by the government that linked the
restriction to the furtherance of equality under s. 15 (1), the court would have dealt with
the restriction as a restriction that limited the amelioration of disadvantage ex-
perienced by aboriginal people, and that restriction would have had to be dealt with
under s.1. As noted above, the court maintained that s.15(2) does not immunize special
programs from constitutional review.
The apparent "bottom line":
1. As ever, objectives which are thoughtfully crafted with an eye to constitutional
validity and operational logic can enable the government to operate restricted
special programs with impunity. Any challenge will be answered either at the
Lovelace stage, a review of the constitutionality of the objectives and the fit of
the applicant to those objectives, or at the s.1 stage.
2. A s.15(2) program may be successfully challenged by a member of a disad-
vantaged group who fits within the Constitutionally valid objectives of the
program.
40. Ibid at 760.
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where the substance of a program is authorized by s.15(1), if "some feature
of it (is) discriminatory (it will) infringe s.15(1)." The court appears to hint
at the acceptability of an argument that members of privileged groups would
not get past the s.15(2) analysis: "The language and history of s.15(2) seem
to militate against such challenges ... by members of socially advantaged or
privileged groups" (para 65). However, it is clear that if a member of a
disadvantaged group proves a feature of the program discriminatory, the
government would be required to justify it under s. 1.
the restriction of a program to certain subsets of a disadvantaged group would
have to have a constitutionally valid purpose to satisfy the Lovelace
analysis.41
G. Eldridge: Significant Help from the Supreme Court of Canada
The Supreme Court's decision in Eldridge v British Columbia42 is highly relevant and
extremely useful to the work of poverty law advocates in an era in which governments
seem determined to get out of the business of public service:
The Supreme Court concluded that, although a legislature may give authority
to a body that is not subject to the Charter, the Charter applies to all the
activities of government whether or not they may be otherwise characterized
as "private" and it may apply to non-governmental entities in respect of
certain inherently governmental actions. The Court found that governments
should not be allowed to evade their constitutional responsibilities by delegating
the implementation of their policies and programs to private entities. This
conclusion by the Court is extremely timely, given the growing trend of
government to "privatize" core government functions such as social assistance.
* In the context of government refusing to supply a needed service, the Court
also provided a detailed review of important issues in constructive dis-
crimination, and some guidance about the burden of proof under s. 1.
41. For example, it appears likely that:
- the program at issue in Ontario Human Rights Commission v Ontario (1994) 19 OR (3d)
387 (CA) (discussed in "Poverty Law in Ontario: The Year in Review", Ellsworth,
Morrison, Keene, Rapsey, Pearce; (1994) 10 Journal of Law and Social Policy 1)
would have satisfied the Lovelace analysis if it had been a program to assist blind
persons to find remunerative employment, and the restriction in question had been to
persons of working age.
- a program such as Wheeltrans, with its broad objectives relating to mobility, would
not satisfy the test if it attempted, for example, to restrict itself to "seriously"
handicapped" people. The court in Lovelace did "not have to determine the question
of relative disadvantage to decide this appeal" ibid at 760.
42. Supra, fn 1.
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The three plaintiffs in Eldridge were born Deaf. They are fluent users of American
Sign Language, but have limited skills in written English and none in spoken English.
The problem at issue in Eldridge was the failure of the British Columbia health
insurance scheme to pay for sign language interpretation for deaf beneficiaries. The
plaintiffs, who included a diabetic whose diabetes was not easily controlled and a
woman who had experienced the premature birth of twins without being able to
communicate with the medical personnel involved, provided compelling evidence as
to the need for clear communication between health workers and patients. However,
two out of three members of the B.C. Court of Appeal concluded that there had been
no breach of section 15.
The majority of the B.C. Court of Appeal chose the narrowest possible definition of
the purpose of the health insurance legislation at issue, contrary to the usual principles
of statutory interpretation. The purpose of the legislation, according to the Court, was
not to make the included health services available, it was to "remove the responsibility
to make payment". By using this device, the court was able to locate the plaintiff's
burden outside the ambit of the legislation.43
Eldridge was overturned on appeal to the SCC, in a unanimous decision by the full
panel, written by Laforest, J.
The Court decided that the legislation itself did not infringe the Charter, but that the
decision not to fund the service did. Because the decision-makers were hospitals and
the BC Medical Services Commission, a considerable part of the decision it devoted
to the issue of whether the entities in question were subject to the Charter (s.32). The
Court found that they were.
In regard to s. 15, the Court found that the failure by the government to provide what
was needed to ensure that the applicants benefitted equally from a service offered to
everyone constituted a denial of equal benefit of the law. In doing so, the Court dealt
conclusively with some of the more specious arguments that have been tendered by
government in s. 15 cases. The Court:
rejected the argument that failure to provide a service is government
."inaction", and cannot be challenged under the Charter:
[66] Unlike in Simpsons-Sears and Rodriguez, in the present case the adverse ef-
fects suffered by deaf persons stem not from the imposition of a burden not faced by
the mainstream population, but rather from a failure to ensure that they benefit
equally from a service offered to everyone ...
[72] ... the respondents and their supporting interveners maintain that s. 15(1) does
not oblige governments to implement programs to alleviate disadvantages that exist
independently of state action. Adverse effects only arise from benefit programs,
they aver, when those programs exacerbate the disparities between the group claim-
ing a s. 15(1) violation and the general population. They assert, in other words, that
43. The Ontario Court of Appeal used a similar narrow interpretation of a statute's purpose to defeat a
Charter claim in Schafer supra fn 12.
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governments should be entitled to provide benefits to the general population
without ensuring that disadvantaged members of society have the resources to take
full advantage of those benefits ...
[73] In my view, this position bespeaks a thin and impoverished vision of s. 15(1). It
is belied, more importantly, by the thrust of this Court's equality jurisprudence. It
has been suggested that s. 15(1) of the Charter does not oblige the state to take posi-
tive actions, such as provide services to ameliorate the symptoms of systemic or
general inequality; see Thibaudeau, supra, at para. 37 (per L'Heureux-Dub6 J.).
Whether or not this is true in all cases, and I do not purport to decide the matter
here, the question raised in the present case is of a wholly different order. This
Court has repeatedly held that once the state does provide a benefit, it is obliged to
do so in a non-discriminatory manner...
[77]... Section 15(1) expressly states, after all, that every individual is "equal before
and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the
law without discrimination ..." (emphasis added). The provision makes no distinc-
tion between laws that impose unequal burdens and those that deny equal benefits.
If we accept the concept of adverse effect discrimination, it seems inevitable, at
least at the s. 15(1) stage of analysis, that the government will be required to take
special measures to ensure that disadvantaged groups are able to benefit equally
from government services.44
in defiming the purpose of the legislative scheme at issue, took a broad and
remedial approach:
[50] ... The inter-locking federal-provincial medicare system ... entitles all
Canadians to essential medical services without charge.
[59] ... the functional values underlying the health care system. Those values con-
sist of the promotion of health and the prevention and treatment of illness and dis-
ease, and the realization of those values through the vehicle of a publicly funded
heath care system. There could be no personal characteristic less relevant to these
values than an individual's physical disability.
[71] ... the system is intended to make ability to pay irrelevant.45
. maintained a generous and purposive interpretation of the Charter:
[53] ... I emphasize at the outset that s. 15(1), like other Charter rights, is to be
generously and purposively interpreted.... As Lord Wilberforce proclaimed in Min-
ister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, [1980] A.C. 319, at p. 328 (P.C., Bermuda), a con-
stitution incorporating a bill of rights calls for "a generous interpretation avoiding
what has been called 'the austerity of tabulated legalism,' suitable to give in-
dividuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to" ... 46
. reiterated that constructive discrimination is prohibited by s.15:
44. Supra fn 1, at NR 217-224.
45. lbid, at 204, 211,220.
46. Ibid at 206.
Equity Law for Clinic Advocates: A 1997 Review
[60] The only question in this case, then, is whether the appellants have been af-
forded "equal benefit of the law without discrimination" within the meaning of s.
15(1) of the Charter. On its face, the medicare system in British Columbia applies
equally to the deaf and hearing populations. It does not make an explicit "distinc-
tion" based on disability by singling out deaf persons for different treatment. Both
deaf and hearing persons are entitled to receive certain medical services free of
charge. The appellants nevertheless contend that the lack of funding for sign lan-
guage interpreters renders them unable to benefit from this legislation to the same
extent as hearing persons. Their claim, in other words, is one of "adverse effects"
discrimination.
[61] This court has consistently held that s. 15(1) of the Charter protects against this
type of discrimination. In Andrews, supra, McIntyre J. found that facially neutral
laws may be discriminatory. It must be recognized at once", he commented, at p.
164, "... that every difference in treatment between individuals under the law will
not necessarily result in inequality and, as well, that identical treatment may fre-
quently produce serious inequality"; see also Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, at p.
347. Section 15(1), the Court held, was intended to ensure a measure of substantive,
and not merely formal equality.
[62] As a corollary to this principle, this court has also concluded that a dis-
criminatory purpose or intention is not a necessary condition of a s. 15(1) violation.
... A legal distinction need not be motivated by a desire to disadvantage an in-
dividual or group in order to violate s. 15(1). It is sufficient if the effect of the legis-
lation is to deny someone the equal protection or benefit of the law. As McIntyre J.
stated in Andrews, supra, at p. 165, "[t]o approach the ideal of full equality
before and under the law ... the main consideration must be the impact of the
law on the individual or the group concerned". 47 [emphasis added]
denied the relevance of government's attempt to argue that particular
individuals were not as badly affected as they could have been:
[83] ... it is not in strictness necessary to decide whether, according to this standard,
the appellants' s. 15(1) rights were breached. This Court has held that if claimants
prove that the equality rights of members of the group to which they belong have
been infringed, they need not establish a violation of their own particular rights.
48
Finally, the Court dealt with s. 1:
[84] ... Assuming without deciding that the decision not to fund medical interpreta-
tion services for the deaf constitutes a limit "prescribed by law", that the objective
of this decision - controlling health care expenditures - is "pressing and substan-
tial", and that the decision is rationally connected to the objective, I find that it does
not constitute a minimum impairment of s. 15(1).49
47. Ibid, at 211-212, emphasis added.
48. Ibid at 228, emphasis added.
49. Ibid at 230.
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In so deciding, the Court once again dealt with some arguments commonly raised by
government in s.15 cases. The Court:
while not ruling on whether it should take a deferential approach in the
context of social programs, reiterated that government is obliged to show
that it has infringed Charter rights no more than reasonably necessary:
[85] ... It is also clear that while financial considerations alone may not justify
Charter infringements (Schachter, supra, at p. 709), governments must be afforded
wide latitude to determine the proper distribution of resources in society; see Mc-
Kinney, supra, at p. 288, and Egan, supra, at para. 104 (per Sopinka J.). This is
especially true where Parliament, in providing specific social benefits, has to choose
between disadvantaged groups; see Egan, supra, at paras. 105-110 (per Sopinka J.).
On the other hand, members of this Court have suggested that deference should not
be accorded to the legislature merely because an issue is a "social" one or because a
need for governmental "incrementalism" is shown; see Egan, supra, at para. 97 (per
L'Heureux-Dub6 J.) and at paras. 215-216 (per Iacobucci J.). In the present case, the
failure to provide sign language interpreters would fail the minimal impairment
branch of the Oakes test under a deferential approach. It is, therefore, unnecessary
to decide whether in this "social benefits" context, where the choice is between the
needs of the general population and those of a disadvantaged group, a deferential
approach should be adopted.
[86] At the same time, the leeway to be granted to the state is not infinite. Govern-
ments must demonstrate that their actions infringe the rights in question no more
than is reasonably necessary to achieve their goals. 50
. dismissed a "floodgates" argument as purely speculative:
[92] ... To deny the appellants' claim on such conjectural grounds, in my view,
would denude s. 15(1) of its egalitarian promise and render the disabled's goal of a
barrier-free society distressingly remote. 51
II. HOW To GET THERE FROM HERE
A. New Legislation; New Needs for Litigation on Behalf of Poor Clients
There have been years when advances in equity jurisprudence could be used to
persuade government to amend or repeal discriminatory provisions in legislation and
regulations, or to alter practices. However, in the past few years, government has
afforded no opportunities for dialogue, despite continued efforts on the part of
communities.
To the continuing refusal of the provincial government to listen to affected com-
munities has been added an unprecedented wave of new legislation affecting all core
areas of Clinic practice. The nature of the new legislation is also unprecedented.
Overwhelmingly, it is harsh and punitive, with wholesale roll-backs of rights pre-
50. Ibid at 231-232.
51. Ibid at 236.
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viously considered fundamental, and severe cuts to the number of important issues
which can be reviewed effectively by an administrative tribunal. The provincial
government appears increasingly willing to ignore Charter and human rights issues
in legislation and social policy, and to simply wait for challenges. 52 Clinics will find
themselves forced into the courts more than ever before, as there is no other effective
way to address serious breaches of the fundamental rights of poor people.
B. Getting Action from the Ontario Human Rights Commission
Advocates with an interest in human rights have for some years been seriously
concerned about dysfunction within the Ontario and, to a lesser extent, the federal
Human Rights Commissions. In respect of Ontario in particular, there is significant
evidence of lack of application of substantive human rights jurisprudence, lack of
concern for human rights in general, and an unhelpful and dismissive attitude toward
complainants in particular.
53
It is probably no coincidence that breaches of the Human Rights Code are being litigated
in the courts or in other tribunals, whenever the client has a cause of action independent
of the human rights complaint.54 However, in the vast majority of cases, where getting
52. For an analysis of this trend in social assistance legislation, see I. Morrison, "What Does Bill 142
Mean for Clinic Practice?" Clinic Resource Office, October 1997.
53. see "Dysfunction in the Human Rights Complaints System: Brief of the Coalition for the Reform of
the Ontario Human rights Commission" November, 1995; M. Hart, G. Sanson, "Filing a Complaint
and the New Mediation Procedure: the Complainant's Perspective" New Developments at the On-
tario Human Rights Commission (December 1997) Law Society of Upper Canada, Continuing Legal
Education Series.
54. It is now established that both courts and administrative tribunals have a duty to apply human rights
legislation where it is relevant to cases properly before them. Examples have arisen:
in actions for wrongful dismissal: L'Attiboudeaire v Royal Bank (1996) 131 DLR (4th)
445, 88 OAC 70 (Ont CA), Galea v General Motors (unreported) [1993]
OJ No.3224 (OCJ/GD), Alpaerts v Obront [1993] OJ No. 732 (OCJ) [unreported],
Lehman v Davis [1993] OJ No 2891 (OCJ) [unreported], Sargeant v Patterson Dental
Canada [unreported] [1979] OCGD No. 97-CU-1 16745
in an application for a declaration in regard to an insurance contract: Re London Life
Insurance Co. and Ontario Human Rights Commission et al (1985), 50 OR (2d) 748
in an application under s. 60 of the Trustee Act RSO 1980, c. 512: Canada Trust
Co. v Ontario Human Rights Commission (1990), 74 OR (2d) 481 (Ont. CA)
at SARB: SARB M-02-21-31 (Nov. 7, 1994; Cardinal) [CRO # SA/D-1925]
at WCAT: Decision No. 13/90 (1990) 13 WCATR 314, Decision 852192, (1993) [unreported]
Information and Privacy Commissioner: Order P-540 (Sept.24, 1993)
On the obligation of tribunals to apply human rights legislation, see Douglas College v.
Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association et al (1990), 77 DLR (4th) 94 (SCC), review of
jurisprudence (at 116-119) by Madame Justice Wilson; Re ONA and Etobicoke General Hospital 14
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the complaint before a court or other tribunal is unfeasible, attempting to get the
Commission to deal with the matter appropriately remains the only route to redress.
The Commission's deficiencies are such that an unrepresented complainant has almost
no chance of a favourable result. Further, taking on a complaint file is unnecessarily
labour-intensive, as it is imperative for the complainant's counsel to take on the
following responsibilities:
ensure that the complaint is properly drafted55 and served on all parties (the
Commission's record on this is spotty);
undertake to collect and preserve any evidence, names, addresses and statements of
witnesses, etc (the Commission does not investigate promptly, and may take years
to do so);
ensure that the Commission has a written direction from the client in regard to who
the Commission should communicate with directly (it is advisable for counsel to
take on this role);
regularly correspond with the Commission to ask that the maiter be dealt with
promptly, get updates on the investigation, and reiterate interest in the complaint;
get an up-to-date understanding of the relevant caselaw (the Commission cannot be
relied upon);
reduce any communication to or from the Commission to writing, and copy both the
file and the Commission (miscommunication and non-communication is rife); and
take an active part in protecting the client's interests in settlement negotiations.
Finally, it is unfortunate but true that judicial review may be necessary to get
appropriate attention to a complaint from the Ontario Human Rights Commission. The
only bright note is that the caselaw is at least reasonably favourable. To date, there has
been considerable success in judicially reviewing inappropriate dismissals of com-
plaints by the Commission. 56 Recently, a clinic whose client's complaint of sexual
harassment had been dismissed by the Commission, because of the Commission's
opinion that the matter would have been more appropriately dealt with in a grievance
arbitration, filed an application for judicial review, upon which the Commission
reconsidered its decision. The complaint is now being investigated.57
OR (3d) 40 (Div. Ct.); Corner Brook Council v CUPE (19 Feb 1996) (Nfld CA) Yorkton Union
Hospital v Sask. Union of Nurses [1993] 7 WWR 129 (Sask. CA).
55. The Commission must allow complainants to fill in their own complaint forms where they wish to do
so. The Divisional Court has indicated that while the Commission may bring insufficiencies to the
attention of complainants, it may not dictate what goes into the complaint form: Bridges v Ont.
Human Rights Commission (1991) unreported decision, Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. File No. 157/91.
56. see for example: Sing Mark v Ontario Human Rights Commission and Litton Systems (1996) 90
OAC 122 (Ont. Div Ct), Stein v OHRC and Norman Hill Realty (12 Aug, 1996) unreported; Court
File# 196/96.
57. Clinic counsel who are considering judicial review of the Commission may wish to contact the CRO
and ask to be put in touch with clinic counsel on record in CRO file # 97012359.
